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This thesis explores the potential role of combat simulation modeling in the 
Naval Special Warfare mission plarming cycle. It discusses methods for bridging the 
gap bet-Neen the simu lation and mission planning processes, addressing strengths 
and weaknesses as well as employment considerations. 
Th is thesis describes the processes involved in modeling and simulation and 
discusses how the stochastic nature of simulation is particularly relevant to combat. 
Deliberate, Time-sensitive, and Dynamic mission planning are described and the 
commonality of tactical planning in cach instance is established. Based on this 
framework, a notional SEAL scenario is used to illustrate the role of simulation in 
each type of mission planning, focusing primarily at the tactical level. The thesis 
conc ludes by discussing additional applications orcombat simulation modeling within 
the Naval Special Warfare conununity and makes recommendations for its effective 
and efficient implementation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are unique because they provide the National 
Command Authority (NCA) with a broad rangc of capabilities that can be of great utility 
across the operational continuum. SOF are particularly uscful as an instrunH::nt of national 
powcr when the internat ional circlUTIstances call for a US military response less than the 
commitment of conventional military forces .' Today's changing world order, v.;th untold 
numbers of small ongoing conflicL~, may increasingly require the use ofSOF. 
The virtual omnipresence of the media and their apparent fascination with SOF 
assures publicity regardless of the results of a special operation (SO). Negative. skewed, or 
uninfonncd publicity often equates to a degree of negative public opinion towards military 
operations, SO in particular. This, in turn, may cause decision makers to shy away fro m 
military force regardless of its potential value in a given situation. Tn order to avoid this 
predicament, SOF must utilize any and all resources available to maximize their 
effectiveness and to assure both political and military decision-makers a high probability of 
success prior to employment. 
This thesis explores the potcntial role of combat simulation modeHng in the Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW) mission planning cycle. It St:t;ks to provide an lUlderstanding of the 
processes involved in simulation and how they can benefit Navy SOF during ddiberate, 
time-sensitive, and dynamic mission planning, concentrating on the tactical planning 
inherent to all three. It also addresses additional roles for simulation within the NSW 
community. 
Simulation, according to Webster, is to give a false indication or appearance of; 
fei gn; pretend. It is a fann of mathematical modeling which, as its definition may indicate, 
often carries with it a derogatory inference. Yet the prohibitive costs associated with 
experimental constructs underscore the need to search for indirect methods to study real 
I Joint Chiefs ofStaft; foim Pub 3-05 3: Joint Special Operatjons Operatjonal 
Procedures Washington D.C.: fhc Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993 
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world phenomenon, such as a SEAL combat mission. The mathematical modeling process 
is such a method and consists of the following steps: 
I. Given some real world system or behavior, make observations and gather 
sutficient infonnation to formulate a model. 
2 Analyze the factors influencing the modd and reach mathematical conclusions. 
3. Interpret the model and make predictions or offer explanations. 
4 Test the conclusions about the real-world systcm.2 
Simulation models involve computers which have the capacity to store parameters 
associated with the real-world system and to generate a simulated environment through 
algorithms and functions . Output data are then produced for analysis and interpretation. 
The Monte Carlo, or stochastic simulation, is probabilistic in nature using random 
number generation to determine the final outcome of a particular event. This randomness 
is particularly relevant to combat, where the slightest variation in any number oHactors may 
change the outcome. Determining the potential impact of these various outcomes during the 
mission planning process wili allow for more efficient prior planning and increase the 
probability of mission success. 
This thesis explores the thn:e types of mission planning conducted by Navy SOF -
deliberate, time-sensitive, and dynamic, and discusses the "strategic" application of 
simulation during each. Deliberate planning is planning for a hypothetical situation 
involving the deployment and employment of apportioned forees and resources projected 
to be available. It offers the greatest opportunity to utilize simulation as time constraints are 
less of a factor. Multiple enemy threat packages can be created and plans developed for 
each. Rehearsals can first be nm on a simulation to determine their viability before 
expending resources with actual rehearsals. 
2 Giordano, Frank R. & Weir, Maurice, D. A First C01l& jn Matbematical 
MQQiling, Monterey: BrookS/Colc Publishing Company, 1985. 
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Simulfltion may, however, OfT!;.':T the greatest utility during time-sensitive planning 
which is planning for the deployment and employment of allocflted forces that occurs in 
response to an actual situation. In Time-sensitive planning, reh!;.':arsal time may vary from 
limited to non-existent. While rehearsal on a simulation cannot replace al'tUal rehearsals, and 
cannot provide the answer to what will happen ina given set of circumstanc!;.':s, it can provide 
awareness of contingencies or critical nodcs which may occur and will aliow tor somc degree 
of planning to take place prior to deployment. 
Dynamic mission planning at the tactical level is not formalized in doctrine. 
Occurring during fl conflict wherc there is fl lag in cmployment, tactical elements and thcir 
supporting planners analyze the commander's intent for the area of operations and generate 
Mission Conccpts (MleONs) without having received a mission tasking (MlTASK). 
Simulation can aid in the targct sdcction process as well as in determining the impact and 
priority of individual MICONs. 
The commonality of tactical planrring during the three type of planning discussed 
leads to a role for simulation which spans the planning spectnun. By developing a notional 
SEAL scenario for illustrative purposes, this thesis discusses the possible uses for simulation 
during the tactical or execution planning phase of an operation. Route planning, 
synchronization, weapon selection, and threat locations afe examples. While there is 
potential for quantitative analysis of mission success, detection prObability, and so forth, 
the power of simulation lies more in its ability to makc conditional predictions and aid 
planncrs in considering thcse predictions. This countcnveights the cornmon tendency to 
select the desired option in the face of indications to the contrary. 
This thesis also discusses additional roles for simulation in the NSW commwIity 
including: 
-Databasc for enemy and friendly system characteristics 
-Situation map for exercises and real-·world operations 




There are several employment considerations which must be addressed to aid in thc 
efficient and effective implementation of simulation in the NSW community including 
hardware/software issues, database creation and management, terrain files and the 
identification and training of potential users. Implementation of simulation in the NSW 
community can be accomplished v.ith a minimum expenditure of resources. while its use 
should provide CDst efficient beneficial results. Naval Special Warfare mission plamring and 
mission planners are already highly refined, and while simulation may only providc a small 
qual itative increase in a plan, that increa~e may mean the difference between SllCceSS and 
failure in a special operation. 
xiv 
1. fNTRODlfCT[ON 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquc bccause thcy provide the National 
Command Authority (NCA) a broad range of capabilitics that can be of great utility across 
the opcrational continuulll. SOf are particularly useful as an instrument of national power 
when international circwnstances call for a US military response less than the eonunitment 
of conventional military forccs. [ TodllY'S changing world order, with untold numbers of 
small ongoing conflicts, may increasingly require the use ofSOF 
The current political environment, however, is unforgiving. As special operations 
(SO) are gencrally connected to high political aims and thus highly visible, the accepted 
margin for crror is small. Therc are rarely large campaigns that can conceal individual 
mission failures. Furthermore, mission failures may equate to combat losses. While the 
undesirability ofhunlart loss goes \vithout saying, there is the additional factor ofthc expense 
and training time invested in a SOF operator 
The virtlllll omnipresence of the media and their apparent fascination with SOF 
assures pUblicity regardkss of the mission results. Negative, skewed, or uninformed 
publicity often equates to a degree of negative public opinion towards military operations, 
SO in particular. 'Ibis, in tum, may cause decision makers to shy away from military force 
regardless of its potential value in a given situation. Tn order to avoid this predicament, SOF 
must utilize any and all resources available to maximize their effectiveness and to assure 
both political and mili tary decision makers a high probability of success prior to 
employment. 
According to Joint Pub 3-05.3 , successful SO depend upon three factors: clear 
national and theater strategic objectives; effective command, control, communications. 
computing and intelligence (C4T) and support at the operational level; and competent tactical 
planning and execution. For lhe SOF operator, tactical planning and execution are their 
I Joint Chiefs of Staff . . ,lQin! rub 1_051 · Jojnt Sp~~illD~.1!JiQna1 
~~ Washington D.C The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993. 
primary contribution to mission success. The most visible of these aspects to the political 
and military decision-maker is mission planning. Thc thorouglmess and tactical soundness 
of a plan presented hy SOF during the planning process will impact greatly on the ultim<lte 
employment decision. To this end, mission planning capabilities must be maximized. 
Combat simulation modeling (CSlvt) offcrs SOF planners a tool which can provide 
valuable infonnation not only to the comhat troops but also to decision-makers; political and 
military leaders will have more complete infonnation on which to base employment 
decisions. Anny Special Forces A-teams conducting thcir Joint Readiness Training Center 
(JRTC) rotations are beginning to include mission planning on the Janus combat simulation 
with analysts from the Fort Bragg Simulation Center prior to mission execution. This action 
is in its infancy, but rcsults have heen promising.1 While simulation has been prest:nt in the 
military services for decades, it has found limited use hy ground based SOF planners and 
operators. The technological advances in simulation software, combined with readily 
available and increasingly low oost hardware indicate an opportune time for SOF operators 
to further utilize CSM in mission planning. 
A. OBJECTIVES 
TIus thesis will focus on CSM in the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) mission planning 
process, rather than SOF as a whole. Differences in missions, types and methods of training. 
and strategies and techniques during the planning process require a more focused approach. 
The concept described, however, is applicable to other SOF units as welL 
There are three fundamental objectives to this research. First, to identifY the specific 
contributions combat simulation modeling can provide to the NSW mission planning 
process. The applicahility of CSM will be assessed using a level of analysis commensurate 
with a mission planning agent (MPA). Joint Publication 3-05.5 dcfines the MPA as the 
subordinate special operations foree commander designated by the joint force special 
1 Based on After Action Reports (AAR's) sent by John Wood from the Fort 
Bragg Simulation Center. Copies available. 
operations componcnt commander to validate, plan, and execute a particular special 
operations mission. For NSW this willlikcly equate to a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit 
or Task Group (NSwrurrG), and will incorporate staff planners as well as operational 
forces, inclucling, whenever possible, the forces designated to execute the mission. The focus 
of the lhesis ",ill be on taclical and operational applications, and the ability of CSM to aid 
the MPA in developing and evaluating thorough, tactically sOlUld plans. 
The second objective is to analyze and recommend procedures for employment of 
CSM by both a MPA and thc NSW conununity in gcneral. This analysis will be limited to 
requirements for efficient operation of a simulation, but will nol address procurement issues. 
fhe tinal objective is to identify key SOF, and more specifically NSW elemenL~ 
which are not presently modeled in any simulation. Efforts arc currently being madc to 
create an NS W mission phmning module which would include a tactical level simulation. 
Since there is no currcntly accepted "SOF model", identifYing essential requirements should 
provide a tool to aid in the asscssment of prospective simulations or in the design affuturc 
simulations . 
A recurring theme wil! be stressed througbout this thesis. While there is a great deal 
of time and effort expended in creating detailed simulation models, they are still a 
simplification. It is unrealistic to think that they can account for every possible detail. 
However, an insightful analyst who is knowledgeable about the algorithms and functions 
which are modeled within a simulation can use tllis fact to his advantage during the planning 
process. Knowing which details of a combat mission are modeled and which are not, forces 
an analyst to consider this fact as it pertains to the platming being conducted. A detail which 
is not present in thc model, bUl is deemed important for consideration not only identifies a 
possible shortfall in the simulation, but a possible critical node or essential element of 
jnformation (EEL) for thc mission itself. 
The purpose of this thesis is n.ill to quantitatively analyze any aspect of mission 
planning. Hypotheses will not be subjected to rigorous statistical analysis in order to 
detennine significance. This thesis is intended as a stepping stone towards implementation 
ofCSM in the NSW mission planning process and should provide a recipe for its efTective 
application. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
fhc research design begins with an investigation of the mathematical modeling 
process and its role in simulation. Tills will be followed by a discussion of the 
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of CSM. Subsequently, both the general SOF 
and more specific NS W mission planning processes will be investigated with the intent of 
identifying subject areas for application of CSM. The main focus of the research win be to 
bridge the gap between the concept of simulation modeling and the mission planning 
process. This will be achieved by utilizing the Janus(A) High Resolution Combat Model 
(Janus) to explain and demonstrate the applicability of CSM in contributing to the NSW 
planning process 
rhe Janus simulation was selected for purely practical purposes, as it is readily 
available at the Naval Postgraduate School. Janus does, however, contain the basic 
characteristics and capabilities found in most of the prevalent simulations in the military 
community, and has proven itself effective in the Army since 1973. Furthermore, the Joint 
Conflict Model (JCM) and the Joint Tactical Simulation (ITS) are Janus derivatives. These 
simulations are either in use or development by the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V 
rhe drawbacks in using Janus will also be addressed. The fact that it is a ground 
combat simulation designed for battalion to brigade size operations make it less than ideal 
for NSW purposes in that the human element is not modeled with great detai l. 
Understanding these limitations is important, but they by no means limit the validity oflhis 
research. lbis thesis focuses on the applicability of CSM in general. Janus will he used as 
a reference for discussion and illustration of ~'jJCCific points C{)nceming simulation in mission 
planning. Furthennorc, these limitations will be addressed later in the context of necessary 
characteristics for a SOF specific model. 
Janus will b~ applied in two distinct manners. Fir:;t, Janus capabilities will be 
discussed in the context of aiding in the planning categories previously identified. Methods 
of employment and potential ocnefits and drawbacks to the usc ofCSM in the NSW mission 
planning process will be addressed. Second, utilizing a notional scenario designed for 
illustrative purposes, Janus \\ill be used for the development and analysis of courscs of 
action (COAs) as would occur in a normal mission planning simarion. The results of this 
application of Janus v"ill provide the resources necessary to recommend appropriate 
application of CSM to NS\V mission planning, as well as to identify necessary additions to 
a SOF specific combat model. 
C. ORGA.!"'IJIZA TION 
TIlis thesis is divided into five chapters including the introduction. Chapter (J 
provides a brief historical backgroWld of simulation in the militar), followed by a cursory 
dcscription of the mathematical process of modeling and the stodtastic nature of simulation. 
This chapter will also identify capabilities and limitations ofCSM v.ith specific reference 
to the Janus model. Chapter III discusses the SOF doctrine for mission planning and NSW 
specific approaches. Chapter IV is the heart of the research \\ith a discussion of the actual 
application of Janus to the NSW mission planning process, first at the strategic level 
followed by its practical application to a notional SEAL scenario. Chapter V contains a 
discussion of alternative roles for simulation in the NSW community, other SOCOM 
models, employment considerations, conclusions and rccommcndations. 

n. MODELING Al' D SiMULATION 
Modeling and simulation have a long history of application in military (;ir(;lc:;. While 
simulation beg:m as a prru.:tical exercise rather th:m computer based, technological 
adv:mcements soon created new tools. Today, modeling:md simulation are used extensively, 
from analyzing supply and budget trends to conducting major Comm:md Post Exercises 
using computer simulation driven scenarios. 
A. MODELING 
An understanding of mathematical modeling and the processes involved ill simulation 
will assi::.'t in detennining the applicability ofCSM to NSW mi:;sion planning. A(;cording 
to Giordano and Weir, a mathematical model is a mathemati(;al construct designed to study 
a particular rcal world system or phenomenon. Use of a model may make it possible to 
predict the future behavior of the phenomenon and analyze the effects various situations have 
on it. 
Rtal World Sy.tenu Mathematiul World 
I ~,~"".~"" II ~~::':'-= I 
01 ANDIUJl.&< 
..... 1HI'M<llCAI.CtlNCL""""'~ 
Figure 1. Mathematical Modeling 
It is very important to realize, however, that the results derived from a mathematical 
model are mathematical conclusions as indicated in Figure 1. The value of the results is 
limited to the accuracy of the model used. For this reason, as will be discussed later, the 
algorithms used in a simulation must be accessible to analysts and understood so that they 
may be validated and adjusted a~ necessary. 
The alternative to a model is for an analyst to create a real world test or experiment 
and observe the effects on the real world behavior. T here are many situations, howcver, 
where the costs of such a course for even a single experiment are unacceptab1e. For example, 
detennining lhe dosage at which a particular drug becomes fatal or studying the radiation 
fallout effects should the San Onofre nuclear power plant experience an accident In 
preparation for or during acrual combat, training and rehearsals for a particular mission can 
be conducted as time and resources pennit. While placing friendly forces in opposing roles 
is the most valuable and realistic form of simulating the enemy, it can attain only a limited 
level of realism. Individuals are not threatcned by actual advcrsaries with weapons, and 
actions by both sides are limited by safety constraints. 
These prohibitive costs underscorc the need to scarch for indirect methods to study 
real world systems or phenomenon, such a~ a SEAL combat mission. The mathematical 
modeling process, as depicted in Figure 2, is such a method and consists of the following 
steps: 
I. Given some real world system or behavior, make observations and gather 
sufficient infonnation to formulate a model. 
2. Analyze the factors influencing the model and reach mathematical conclusions. 
3. Interpret the model and make predictions or offer explanations. 
4. Test the conclusions about the real-world system. 
Figure 2. The Modeling Process 
There are different types of models which serve VariOll" purpoSl;.':s. Mathematical 
models include graphical. symbolic, simulation and experimental constructs. Trajectory 
plots ofvarioll" mortar fOlIIlds are an I;.':xanlpie ofa graphical model. A symbolic model may 
be a formula, system of equations, or a miniature replication of a real-world object like a 
spacecraft. The lack of opportunity to utilize experimental construcl~, for the reasons 
previously discussed, gives way to simulation modeling. 
B. SIi\-lULATION 
Simulation generally has a derogatory inference in everyday usage, which is 
lIIlderstandable given Webster's definition ofthe term simulate - to give a false indication or 
appearance of; pretend; feign. Yet the value of simulators in training pilots wa" realized long 
ago. A primary rea "on for the negative view of simulation is a lack of knowledge on the part 
of potential users. The purpose of this section is to provide a hasic understanding and 
appreciation of the simulation process. 
A behavior being modeled is either deterministic or probabilistic. Processes with an 
element of chance involved, such as the rolling of dice, are probabilistic. Detcnnining the 
area under a curve, while it may be impossible to find precisely, is deterministic. The 
strength of a high resolution simulation model, at the Systt:ffi level, is its ability to model 
probabilistic behavior, providing users with an analysis tool otherwise unavailable. 
Simulation models involve computers having the capacity to store parameters 
associated with the real-world system and to generate a simulated environment through 
algorithms and functions. Output data is then produced for analysis and interpretation. One 
of the most common types of simulation and the type found in most military computer 
simulations, is the Monte Carlo process. 
1. Strengths 
The principle advantage of the Monte Carlo simulation is the relative ease with which 
it can be lL~ed to model very complex probabilistic behaviors, such as combat. Furthermore, 
it can provide performance estimations over a wide range of conditions rather than a 
restricted range as often required by an anal)1ical model. A combat simulation model is a 
perfect example. A SEAL mission can be executed as a stand alone mission against a single 
target or as part of a large scale joint operation. Additionally, since submodels within the 
simulation can be altered \':ith relative ease, there is the potential of conducting a sensitivity 
analysis. For example, if successive runs of a specific SEAL mission in a large joint 
operation continually yield a certain result, various submodels can be altered, such as the 
characteristics of a close air supPOrt (CAS) flight, to determine the effects of different CAS 
alternatives. Critical nodes during a mission may be identified during this process allowing 
for prior planning. Finally, the modeler has control over the level of detail in a simulation. 
For example, a three day mission can be compressed in time or a ten minute time on target 
expanded, giving a great advantage over experimental models. 
10 
2. Weaknesses 
!lIe probabilistic nature of a :\1onte Carlo simulation limits the conclusions that ,-,an 
be dra\"1l from a single run, lluh::ss a sensitivity analysis is cooduckrl. Such an analysis often 
requires many mure runs just to consider a small nwnber of combinations of conditions that 
can occur in the various suhmodds. This limitation then forces thl;.': modeler to estimate 
which combinations might occur for a panicuiar set of conditions. While this is a limitation 
of simulation, it is largely accounted [or by the planning process itself, where intelligence 
estimates combine with tactical planning to create best guess situations. 
Furthennorc, even though a simulation may correctly identify which of the various 
alternatives tested seems best, it ~1ill cannot provide an optimal solution because it cannot 
consider all possible altematives. This means that considcrable judgement is required to 
determine which altcrnativcs to simulate. Once again, simulation should not and can not take 
the place of cornman sellse and standard mission plaruling procedun::s. The considerable 
judg!;.":ment used to detcnnine which alternatives 10 consid!;.":r is pan of the mission plmming 
process regardkss of whcther simulation is util ized. 
Understanding the inherent weaknesses in simulation is necessary in ord!;.":r to take full 
advantag!;.": of the inherent strengths. Simulation docs not provide "the answer", only 
prospectivc "answers" with insight into their value. Therc is a danger in placing too much 
confidenc!;.": in the predictions resulting from a simulation, cspecially if the assumptions 
present in thc simulation are not ckarly stated. Furthermore, the appearance of using large 
amounts of data and computer time, combined with the fact that a layman can easily 
understand a simulation model and the computer output o1kn leads to overconfidence in the 
rcsults. 
C. THE STOCHASTIC PROCESS 
The Monte Carlo simulation is generally considered synonymous with stochastic 
simulation, meaning there is an element of randomness to the outcome of a particular event 
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This randomness is the source of much consternation in the mathcmatical community. 
Unfortunately, many of the so-called random functions supplied v.ith computers are far from 
random, and many simulation studies have been invalidated as a consequence. 
Take for example the follov,ing seemingly random sequence 
13, 8,1,2, ) 1, 14,7,12,13,12,17,2,11,10,3 
It is actually generated by the simple deterministic mle X;. X,., . X;., • X,." MOD 20, and 
the sequence repeats after 248 terms.) Althongh it appears random, and its solution eludes 
even the best minds in mathematics, it may not be suitable as the random number generator 
function 'within a particular simulation. 
This discussion is included for two reasons. Primarily, to demonstrate, in a very 
minnte marmer, tht: level of consideration and detail which go into the development of 
simnlation models. What may appear as a trivial matter to the average user of a combat 
simulation model, the generation of a random munber receives substantial attention in order 
to ensure validity in the model. 
The second reason is to emphasize the need fo]." randomness in a combat simulation. 
The bottom line is that it is impossible to account for every factor influencing a specific 
event in the real world. For example, the best trained sniper aCCDunts for current wind speed 
and direction, range to the target, bullet drop at the calculated range, temperature, target 
motion, etc. The outcome of these calculations is an aimpoint which should result in a hit. 
A second round fired undcr what appears to be the exact same conditions will rarely strike 
the exact same point. Why? Slight variations in the number of grdins of powder in the 
cartridge, indiscernible changes in wind speed/direction or temperature, changes in breathing 
3 This example was taken from Ripley, Brian D., Stochastic Sjmulatiop, New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987. 
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patterns during trigger pull, etc. all impact on the process. It may be one time out often or 
one time out ofa hlUldred thousand that these variations combine to result in a missed shot, 
but it happens. This outcome can he considen::d r"dndom. 
A simulation reproduces this random effect through random number generation. for 
example, in the Janus simulation, if all conditions arc satisfied for a unit to fire at an enemy 
target, the final outcome is detennined by nmdom number generation. If the simulation is 
designed for a 90% kill rate wIder the given circlUTI5ianCeS, a random number draw between 
o an 10 will be made and compared to the number 9. [fthe random number is less than 9, 
a kill occurs. The other 10"10 arc misses. There is no way to predict, however, when the hits 
and misses will occur, thus the randonmess. 
The description of the Janus ilirect fire algorithm included later in this chapter further 
stresses the fact that a great deal of dctail goes into the development ora simulation model. 
The potential for detail is unlimited, but more detail requires more money to develop and 
more computer time to run, considerations which must be addressed. 
The negative connotation which accompanies simulation is proliferated because the 
avemgc potential user lacks even basic knowledgeable about the process and assumes tbat 
the "scientists" who develop them do not understand how the real world functions. These 
two facts can preclude simulations from being used in a productive manner by operational 
military forces 
It is important to remember that because simulation is mathematical in nature does 
not mean that a given input will always yield the same result. The stochastic, or 
probabilistic, nature of a Monte Carlo simulation insures some degree of randomness in 
outcomes. Ifunderstocxl., this is of great value in a combat simulation model , such as Janus, 
where the same battle replayed will not yield the same results. "Winners'· and "losers" may 
remain the same but target selection, munber of rolU1ds fired to achieve a kill, etc. can vary 




The Janus simulation was named for the t\.vo-faced Roman god of portals who 
guarded the gates of Rome by looking in t\.vo directions at the same time. It is an interactive, 
two sided, closed, stochastic, ground combat simulation. 
Janus is "interactive" in that the cOnulland and oontrol functions are entered on 
workstations by individuals deciding what to do in crucial situations during simulated 
combat. "Two sided" refers to the t\ .... o opposing forces , blue and red, directed 
simultaneously usually by two sets of players . "Closed" means that the disposition of 
opposing forces is largely unknown to the players in control of the other force. "Stochastic" 
refers to the way the system detennines the results of actions such as direct fire engagements; 
acoording to the laws of probability and chance. "Ground combat" means that the principle 
focus is on grolUld maneuver and artillery units, although Janus also models weather and its 
effects, day and night visibility, engineer support, minefield employment and breaching, 
rotary and fixed wing aircraft, resupply, and a chemical environment. It supports conflict 
from individual systems and company sized units through brigadelregimental sized units. 
The Janus simulation uses digitized terrain developed by the Defense Mapping 
Agen(;y by displaying it in a fdIlliliar military fonn with contour lines, roads, rivers, 
vegetation, and urban built-up areas. Each representation is also familiarly color-coded, i.c. 
rivers are blue, vegetation is green, and so forth. :Most importantly, the terrain affects the 
line of sight algorithms used for acquiring and engaging targets as well as the maneuvering 
speed ofthe simulated system. 
Janus represents each individual system with an individual icon. This allows the 
analyst to observe and modify the actions or parameters of an individual oombat process and 
collect the data from the resultant outcomes. It can also utilize individual icons to represent 
any number of the same system. Thus a fire team, squad or platoon can all be represented 
by a single icon if desired and the actions of that unit can be modified observed or quantified. 
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2. Strengths 
The strength of the Janus simulation is the strength of simulation in general; its 
ability to modd complex probabilistic behavior. The specific ways in which it docs this as 
well as the application of these processes to mission planning \vill be dis(;ussed in detail in 
Chapter lV. 
3. \Veaknesses 
There are drawbacks in using Janus as the model of interest. Janus is a ground 
combat simulation, which is less than ideal for NSW purposes. Modeling tactical situations 
in a maritime environment, specifically those which may include water depth, currents, tides, 
etc. (such as combat sv.immer opcrJ.tions) proves difficult. Additionally, Janus was 
designed for battalion to brigade size operations. Although individuals can be modeled, the 
detail with which it is accomplished is insufficient for a special operations force where 
variations in the hwnan element may have a tremendous impact, specifically when it comes 
to tactical actions. For example, Janus will not allow an individual mounted on anothcr 
system to flrc at a target if one is acquired. Thus, a fire team approaching the beach in a 
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) would not fire at an acquired target even if it 
satisflcd engagement pammctcrs. \\'hile there are ways to account for such situations to 
somc degree, a SOF model should include this type of detail and capability at the individual 
level in ordt:! to better simulatc tactical situations. Although modeling the human element 
is an inhcrent problem for any computer simulation, Janus' representation needs 
improvement for widespread NSW use. 
4. Tbe JKDUS Datahase 
As with any simulation, all accurate and complete database is crucial to the operation 
of Janus. Development, managcment. and maintenance of the database are essential task:; 
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requiring detailed knowledge of the structure of the database and how the elements which 
make it up interact to produce particular results during simulation runs.4 
The Janus database is complex and includes functions and data relationships \",here 
the significance is not intuitively obvious. For historic reasons, the database is arrange<! 
"horizontally" - that is, feature by feature rather than "vertica!ly" - or system by system. It 
was originally deemed more important to he able to change one kind of data about several 
systems quickly rather than deal with systems one at a time. The database includes 
information on the physical and perfonnance characteristics of systems (soldier, tank, 
aircraft, etc.), sensors (eyeballs, binoculars, radars, etc.), and weapons. Infonnation 
includes sensor detection capabilities, system mobility, capacity and survivability, weapons 
lethality and range, logistics characteristics, tactical parameters such as target priorities, and 
so forth. Tn many instances, a single characteristic for a single unit may be different versus 
every enemy unit. For example, unique Probability of Hit (PH) values are given for a single 
weapon versus every valid target. 
The database is also complex since it models so many parts of the battlefield in great 
detail. For instance, line of sight is explicitly modeled to include the effects of intervening 
vegetation. Mineflelds are represented as compose<! of single mines, each at a specific 
location. Each is modeled as an individual rather than having the entire minefield treated as 
an aggregate. The relationships henveen system and weapon characteristics may be obscure. 
leading to inevitable surprises 
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, it is the robustness of the database and the ability 
to manipulate it easily and quickly that can provide the insightful analyst with a powerful 
tool during mission planning. As a simple example, suppose a mission had been planned, 
entered into Janus and run multiple times, yielding genera!!y successful results. It is noted 
in the post-run analysis, however, that the same unit is consistently responsihle for what 
4 Department oftlle Army. Data Base Manag~, Ft Leavenworth, KS: 
Headquarters, TRADOC Analysis Center, 1993. 
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appears to be a critical kill at a critical time - and the kill is occurring at 300 meters with a 
CAR-15. 'Ine PH value for the firing unit versus the specific targl;.':t can be altered by any 
de~ired factor and the simulation re-nU1 in OrdtT to detenninc the impact aflhal engagement. 
PH values are, in effect, a quantifiable measure of weapon accuracy - the bdtcr skilled 
shooter would have a greater PH value. The potential for mission analysis ,"vith this sing1e 
database entry is obvious. The fact that the database contains dozens of entries for individual 
systems would indicate additional potential. Utilizing this potential "'ill be discussed at 
length in Chapter IV 
5. A Janus Algorithm - Direct Fire 
As discussed previously, simulations contain many submodels. The following is a 
description of the Direct Fire submodel contained v.ithin Janus,l While it docs not describe 
all of the mathematical processes involved in thc programs, the concept is made clear_ This 
description is included to give potential users ofa sor simulation an idea of the processes 
and the detail that a simulation involves for what appcars to hI;.': a straight forward event-
shooting at the enemy. 
Direct fire takes place automatically during a simulation run when opposing units are 
within rangc and have targets. These events are bandled hy a set of programs which perfonn 
the following ta'>ks for a unit each time they arc invoked: 
-Detennine if the unit is able to firl;.': al this time 
-Select the target and appropriate weapon 
-Fire either one round or a burst and record the event 
-Suhtract the anununition used from the units supply list 
-Detennine when the round will impact 
1 The description ofthl;.': Direct Fire Algorithm is taken directly from pages 131-
133 of Department ofthc Anny. Software Design Manual, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Headquarters TRADOC Analysis Command, May 1993 
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-Make a preliminary detennination of the number of kills. At impact time, 
detennine if the kills are still valid. Record kills, if any. 
-Calculate the earliest ncxt possible firing time for the unit 
-Reschedule thc unit for its next firing cvent 
Ioitial Firing Requirements - In order to engage, a direct fire unit must: 
-Be alive and operable 
-Not be in a Hold Fire mode (a command which can be manually entered for 
specifiC units so they will not tire at enemy targcts.) 
-Not be suppressed by enemy fire 
-Not be mounted on another unit ( a weakness in the model) 
-Have at least one enemy unit on its potential target list. 
If the unit meets all ofthesc criteria, processing continues. Otherwise, it is rescheduled for 
evaluation at a later time. 
Weaponffarget Selection Once the unit is evaluated as being able to shoot, the program 
looks at the entries in the unit's target list. The entries are processed from first to last. An 
cntry must possess the following qualifications for a direct fire event to take place. If the 
entry does not possess one of the qualifications, the next entry on the target list is evaluated. 
-The target must still be in acquisition range and still be alive. 
-The target must be within range of the firing unit's weapon. If the target is in full 
defilade, the firing unit mLL~t be within 50 meters of the target. 
-One of the firing unit's weapons must be assigned for use against the target at the 
current range. That wca]Xln must have ammunition. 
-The Single Shot Probability ofKlIl (SSKP) for the weapon against the target is 
calculated by refening the PHJPK tables assigncd. The SSKP ""ill depend on whether the 
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firing unit is stationary or moving, whether the target is stationary or moving, the target's 
posture (exposed or defilade), the aspect of the targd (head on of flank), and the target's 
range. "lbc SSKP may be degraded in certain situations. For example if the firing unit is in 
MOPP starus the SSKP is degraded by the predesignated MOPP factor. If the net SSKP is 
less than 0.05 the target is ignored 
-The target will be ignored if a smoke or dust cloud intersects tht: Line of sight (LOS) 
line between the firer and the target when the weapon is a guided missile which cannot track 
through smoke and dust. 
If 00 targets fit the firing criteria, the next firing evaluation time is determined and 
processing for the firing unit is terminated. Ifonly one target fits the criteria, it is selected 
rfmore than one target fits the criteria, selection is based either 011 the firing priority given 
to the fIring unit for specific targets or, in the case of equal priority, their relative probability 
of selection is calculated by dividing each target's SSKP by the sum of the SSKPs for all 
targets. A random number draw detennines which target is selected 
firing - If a target is a\~dilable, a single firing event takes place against the target The firing 
event may be a single round or a burst, depending on the nwnber of rounds per triggcr pull 
of the weapon. 
Aggregated red units are treated somewhat differently. If there are at least three 
systems in the aggregated unit, they arc considered a single weapon with the capability of 
firing three simultaneous rounds or bursts. This simulates the red tactic of coordinated fire. 
A random number draw is compared to the target's SSKP to determine if it is killed. 
This nwnber is dmv,n three times for an aggregated firing urut. If the target is killed, the 
infonnation about the event is written to a data tile for post-run analysis. lfthe target is not 
killed and it is not a flyer, another single random nwnber is compan::d to the SSKP plus a 
suppression coefficient, a, times one minus the SSKP, eg. (SSKP T a(l-SSKP)). If the 
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random munbcr draw is less the target is suppressed. Again, infonnation on the firing event 
is written to a data file. 
Round accounting - Ammunition accOlmting takes into consideration the number of rolUlds 
ftred, and if the unit is a red aggregated unit, the number of units which ftred simultaneously. 
'The net ammunition usage is subtracted from the unit's supply of that type of arnmlUlition. 
Impact Time - The time of flight for a particular roood is calculated by multiplying the 
munition's velocity by the range to the target. The result is added to the firing time to 
detennine impact time (as a time of day). Impact time may affect the firer since some firers 
cannot move until the round impacts (TOW missile) 
IGII Assessment - A preliminary kill assessment is made at the time the round is fired. The 
SSKP for that weapon/target combination is compared to a random number draw. If the 
SSKP is greater than or equal to the random number, one element of the unit is killed. In the 
case of aggregated red fire, each fOlUld is assessed separately. Units mounted on a killed 
system are also killed. It is possible that at impact time, the target is no longer alive. In tills 
case the round is considered lost and no kill occurs. Any kills are considered valid at impact 
time and infonnation on the event is written into a data file 
Determining the Next Firing Time - This is computed by adding the total time a unit must 
wait between firings (DT) to the current time. DT is calculated using the following [onnula: 
20 
DT=AT+RT + TOF+LT 
\\There: 
AT = AIM TIME This term is always pn:scnt 
RT ~ RELOAD TIME This term is added only if the number of trigger pulls since 
the last reload reaches a predetermined number (i.e. its time 
to change magazines). 
TOF = Time ofrIight 
LT= LAYTIME 
This term is added only if the weapon used cannot fire on 
thcmoyc. 
This term is added only if the present fire results in a kill. 
As shown, the direct fin:: algorithm is designed to take into account as many real world 
factors as possible in order to modd the process of engaging a target. It is important to 
understand this process, for it shows inherent assumptions and limitations of the model, tIm'> 
allowing simulation results 10 he viewed in an accurate manner. As depicted in Figure 2, 
once the mathematical conclusions are reached (kill or no kill), this information must be 
interpreted basctl on an understanding of the process, in order for its value to become 
significant. 
E. SUMMARY 
Simulation is a tool for mission planners, not a\1 end in and of itself. Just as the best 
quality Snap-On tool is no better than a Fishtr Price version if used incorrectly, so 100 is tht 
cast for simulation. While the following chapters will identify multiple areas in the mission 
planning process where simulation can bc of great value, it is important to understand that 
the information gained from its liSt must be carefully analyzed and not merely taken at face 
value. Simulation provides a reliable source for mission analysis, including the ability to 
determine the potential impact of various factors on a givtn situation, but by no means tells 
the planner what ~ happtn in any given circwnstanee. 
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III. MISSIOl'O PLA~'"NING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose oflhis chapter is to outline the types of mission planning conducted by 
Navy SOP and the circumstances under which they may occur. The discussion will hegin 
with the focus on joint doctrine, and conclude with NSW tactical mission planning 
procedures. With an understanding of modeling and simulation from the previous chapter, 
it \"ill become apparent that there is a symbiotic relationship between simulation and many 
aspects of the planning process. 
Acoording to Joint Puh 3-05.5, there are three principks of SO mission planning for 
specific targets. First, specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should contribute 
substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed. Limited resources and the 
extensive planning required dictate that a commander selectively cmploy SOF for high 
priority opcrations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may force thc NCA to 
place specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force size constraints upon the 
employing force. 
Sccond, SOF missions arc complete packages - insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver 
support, extraction - to bc thoroughly plannoo beforc. committing the force. "fbe nature of 
the target, enemy and friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational 
arca are key planning factors. Thcy wil l dictate the size and capability ofthc assigned force. 
the nature of tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force 
exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support 
structure. 
SO targeting and mission planning must be conducted in coordination with all 
applicatJJe thealer and/or task force: agencies. Conventional targeting and strike response 
time for ordnance delivery is extremely quick and may affcct SOP infiltration routes, hide 
sites, or larget areas. Convcntional force planners must be involved during the early 
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planning stages to facilitate coordination and deconflictiQn of aJi assets and 10 allocate 
conventional resources to support and augmt:fit SOF activities. Detailed targeting and 
mission planning is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival of deployed 
operational elements. 
Finally, SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fai l, since SO targets nonnally arc 
perishable eithcr from a military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, detailed, and 
whenever possible, repeated rehearsal is critical . These rehearsals should be conducted v.'ith 
the exact force to be committed and under the same time and distance constraints in an 
environment whose terrain and weather condition closely approximate the operational area. 
A by-product of such rehearsal is that the operational element absorbs alternative courses of 
action and is better able to adapt to changed circumstances during the mission. Commanders 
should recognjze and plan for such preparation time. 
B. MISSION PLANNING 
These principles of mission planning apply across the spectrum of conflict, although 
their emphasis may change depending on the type of planning being conducted and the 
external constraints affecting the process. Following is a discussion of the three types of 
planning commonly conducted by Navy SOF. Joint doctrine describes deliberate and time-
sensitive planning. The third type, referred to hence forth as dynamic planning, is a 
combination of the tv.·o types. 
1. Deliberate Mission Planuing 
Deliberate planning refers to planning for a hypothetical situation involving the 
deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources projected to be available. 
It relies on assumptions regarding the political and military situation that will exist when the 
plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is applicable across tht: operational continuum. 
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Deliberate targeting and mission planning are nOlTImlly conducted in peacetime. 
National sl;.':Cllrily policy is formulated by the NCA and conveyed through Chairman oflhe 
loint Chiefs of Staff (CJeS) guidance to the combatant commanders, who build operational 
plans. Objectives and guidance originate at the national level as broad concepts and are 
refined by subsequent commanders into concepts applicable to the area of operational 
responsibility (AOR). Target development flows from objectives and g11idance reflected in 
operational plans and statements of commander' s intent. 
Deliberate targeting and mission planning can also be applicable in a protracted cris is 
situation, such as the lengthy process leading up to Operation Just Cause in Panama, or in 
a wartime siruation a~ pari of a theater campaign plan, exemplified by Operation Overlord 
against Normandy. Regardless of the situation., deliberate planning involves a lengthy period 
of time. 
Once the targeting process is complete and forces have been selected, the mission 
planning process begins. The target is first validated as appropriate for execution hy SOF. 
Once a target is detennined feasible, joint intelligence assets arc tasked to ereatc a Targct 
Intelligence Package (TIP). Since SO require very detailcd operational and intelligence data. 
Plan of Execution (POE) planning can not commence in any detail until the "I1P is complete. 
The POE is a highly detailed plan written by an operational clemcnt. Tt contains the 
best available opcrational and intelligence information on the target and surrotmding area. 
Exhaustive rchear:;als and demonstrations of the POE are conducted in the field and shortfall 
assessments are continually made. Once the POE is completed, the entire planning packaged 
is compiled into a Special Operations Mission Planning Folder (SOMPF) aod submitted for 
approval. This final product is maintained and periodically updated as long as the target 
remains valid for SOF employment. 
Execution planning is implemcnted only when such a plan is to be executed. It 
involvcs updating of operational and intelligence Esscntial Elemcnts of Worm at ion (EEl's). 
[he Mission Planning Agent (r-.1P A), a combination of hath starr and operational forces, 
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including the forces designated to execute the mission, commcnce isolation. In many cases 
this may bc a Naval Special Warfare Task Group or Task Unit (NSWTGrrU). Isolation 
activities include last minute mission planning, ooordination briefings with 
inscrtion/extraction assets, individual training, rehearsals, adjustmcnts in mission plan, 
cquipment preparation, and rest or sleep immediately preceding insertion into the target area 
Intelligence and operational updates continue until the target is prosecuted. Execution 
mission planning assumes the characteristics of time-sensitive planning as execution nears. 
2. Time-sensitive Mission Planning 
Time-sensitive planning refers to planning for the deployment and employment of 
allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to an actual simation. Like deliberate 
planning it is applicable across the operational continuum. Time sensitive SO targeting and 
mission planning demand flexibility. The ability to meet changing situations with the time, 
intelligence, and manpower available is criticaL While contingem;y targeting and mission 
planning may be either deliberate or time sensitive in nature, crisis and combat mission 
planning are nOTmally time-sensitive. Operations such as Urgent Fury in Grenada have 
emphasized time-sensitive planning. 
Time sensitivity can be viewed from a targetiQ.g or mission planning perspective, or 
a combination of both as in the case of a personnel recovery mission. A target is deemed 
time-sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) 
a danger to friendly forces or is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of oppommity. Time-
sensitive targets are usually mobile, such as a mobile ICBM, or lose their value quickly !mch 
as a bridge being used for an enemy advance. 
A mission is time-sensitive when there is an operatiGnally small time window during 
which the objective of the mission must be obtained. In this case the objective ofthe SOl' 
missiGn may be available for reconnaissance or attack over a long period, but the value is 
high only at a specific time. For example, a radar site just prior to an airborne assault 
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The time-sensitive planning cycle begins \~ith a Mission Tasking ('\-IIT ASK) which 
should be sent no less than 9G hours prior to the earliest anticipated launch time (EAL T) _ 
the time at which a special operations tactical elemenl and its supporting piatioml depart the 
staging area for the operational area. This :\1ITASK generally specifies force selection in 
order for the actual tactical elemenl to be involved in the planning process at the earliest 
possible opportunity. 
No later ihan 72 hours prior to the EAJ.T, the MPA submits a mission concept 
(MleoN) to the Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC) detailing the proposed 
method of completing the assigned mission. The SOCC may approve, alter, or disapprove 
the concept and will respond to the MPA within 8 hours. With MICON approval, detaikd 
mission planning begins. Mission rehearsals and demonstrations are conducted only as time 
pennits. 
3. Dynamic Mission Planning 
Dynamic mission planning at the tactical level i~ not fommlized in doctrine, but 
closely resembles a combination of both deliberate and time, scnsitive planning. Dynamic 
planning is applicable across the operational continuum and is best suited for medium to 
extended duration operations wherc lag time in the employment of tactical elements may 
occur. In this situation, tactical clements and their supporting planners analyze the 
commander's intent for the AO. With a clear understanding ofthis intent, and a clear tactical 
picture of the battlefield, MICONs can be generated without having received a MITASK. 
These MICONs arc submitted up the chain of command for approval. 
Dynamic planning resembles deliberate planning in several respects. First, there is 
no fonnal time constraint placed on the planners, other than the duration of the oouflict. 
Second, the planners arc working from a statement of the commander's intent and gcnerating 
targets and missions designed to employ Navy SOF forces in a manncr which best 
27 
contributcs to that intent. Finally, multiple proposals may be submitted, revised, and 
resubmitted before a single mission is excepted for execution planning. 
Once a mission is accepted for cxecution planning, the dynamic planning proccss 
immediately becomes time-scnsitive in nature. The timc criticality will depend on thc 
mission's place in the scope of the campaign at hand. The tactical element must he prepared, 
however, to enter the time-sensitive planning process at the point of MICON approval with 
as little as 48 hours remaining until EALT. 
Dynamic planning is exemplified by Navy SOF experiences during Desert 
ShieldJDesert Storm. Several MICONs were developed by task unit/task group/platoon 
personnel and submitted for approvaL Each mission was designed to significantly contribute 
to the commanders intent.6 
4. Naval Special Warfare Tactical Mission Planning 
Mission planning doctrine contained within the 3-05 Joint Publication serics focuses 
on SO planning from thc perspective of the commander of a theater Special Operations 
Conunand (COMSOC). They provide procedures for the COMSOC's participation in 
theater-level planning and the supervision of tactical planning by subordinate SOF elements 
The joint publications do not address detailed tactical mission planning (route planning, 
actions at the objective, etc.) because this activity is governed by service guidancc and wilt 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). They do, however, identify the circwnstances under 
which tactical mission planning may occur. 
Each type of mission planning discussed to this point differs in the role that the 
tactical element plays, yet there is a commonality among all three. Deliberate planning for 
a mission such as Sonlay is the ideal situation for SOF: a focuse<! objectivc with ample time 
6 Fwm a discussion \\dth LT Michael Riley, a SEAL Team ONE platoon 
commander in theatcr during the conflict who was a primary participant in the dynamic 
planning process. 
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and reso=s to plan and rehearse courses ofal-'tion (eOAs) prior to execution. While the 
luxury of time and resources may not exist for a mission to be executed within 96 hours, 
tactical planning, i.e. determining eOAs, selecting routes, wcapons, and precise force size 
and structure for the operation, remain virtually identical across the board, with time 
constraints as the primary influence on the process. This type ofpJanning is what the joint 
publications refer to as being governed by service and unit guidance, and is the type which 
,vill be focused on throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
The primary source for NSW mission planning doctrine is Ihe recently published 
Naval Special Warfare Mission Planning Guide, This publication is the culmination of a 
commuruty wide effon to provide a singJt: source dowment for standardized mission 
planning guidance to the operational elements of Naval Special Warfare. The scope of the 
pUblication is to enable mission planncrs to takc a mission directive and, through 
standardized sequential and variable events, produce tactically evaluatcd mission briefs, 
induding coursc of action (COA), concept of operations (CONOPS), brietbacks, waming 
orders, and patrollcader's orders. The briefs which are produced can be viewed as a by-
product of the plan that is developed in the process. Furthcnnore, the guide provides the 
tools necessary to generate MICONs without the aid ofa mission directive. 
The Naval Special Warfare planning cycle can be viewed as a process commencing 
with an alen, continuing through a series of sequential and variable events, and concluding 
with the patrol leader's order.? },:[any ofthc events discussed in thc NSW Mission Planning 
Guide arc directly related to the development of COAs, and will be discussed in the 
following chapter in the context of utilizing simulation to assist in the event during the 
plarming process. Simulation does nol necessarily playa role in each of these events, but 
may contribute significantly to many of them. 
1 For a complete listing ofsequenual and variable events see thc Naval Special 
Warfare },:lission Planning Guide, p. 1-6 
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C. PLANNING WITH SIMULATION 
The following chapter is the bridge between the concept of modeling/simulation 
discussed in Chapter II and the mission planning process described above. It will begin 
somewhat broad in scope, with an I:xamination of the role of simulation during deliberate, 
time-sensitive, and dynamic mission planning, addressing unique applications in each 
circumstance. The focus of the chapter, however, will be on the application of simulation 
during the tactical or execution planning phase, where regardless of the circwnstances 
leading to this point, the actions of tactical planners can be viewed under a single lCllS. 
The sequential and variable events discussed in the NSW Mis~ion Planning Guide 
will be used as a framework for discussing implementation of simulation in mission 
planning. These events serve primarily as a source to focus the planner on an efficient path 
which should cover all aspects of the planning. Simulation may not playa significant role 
during every minute of the planning process, but used correctly it can enhance the final 
product. 
D. SUMMARY 
Regardless of the circumstances surrounding mission planning, the process at the 
tactical level is similar enough to warrant categorizing it as a s ingle entity. Combat 
simulation modeling has the potential of not only aiding in the process of mission planning, 
but filling in certain gaps that are difficult to account for when time and resources are 
Jacking. While the NSW planning process in already efficient and effective, simulation can 
enhance it by forcing planners to evaluate the relative importance of various aspects of a 
mission, as well as by reducing the time spent in many areas of the planning process. 
Understanding the role of simulation and proper methods of application will offer planners 
an additional tool for maximizing effectiveness and employment opportunity. 
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IV. SIMULATION IN THE NSW MISSION PLANNING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Simulation is a powerful tool if and only if it is used correctly, There an: many 
circumstancl:s when:: its us!;.': may be extremely beneficial, but there are also circumstances 
where it is not applicable. This chapler has lv:o purposes. First, to discuss the unique 
circumstances afforded during deliberate, time sensitive, and dynamic planning where 
simulation could be employed. Second, to provide a detailed description of the role of 
simulation in a critical aspect of mission planning - cours!: of action (eOA) development, 
analysis, and selection. Providing a list with detailed explanation of all possible uses of 
simulation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Other aspt:cts of mission planning where 
simulation may be applicahle will, however, be identified and briefly addressed. The 
description of simulation in eOA planning can be extrapolated to these other aspects with 
relative ea"e. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
There are basic rt:oquirements which must be satisfied before simulation can be 
employed by a MPA or at any }.iSW command .. These requirements are assumed to exist 
for tilt: purposes of this chapter and are discussed below. 
I. Analyst/Systems Expert 
The most important consideration, aside from possessing the hardware to run the 
simulation, is to have a skilled analyst available who is familiar with the capabilities and 
operation of the simulation. While there will undoubtedly be numerous users, at least one 
person with an understanding oftbe mathematical processes involved and a familiarity with 
the algorithms and tbe manner in which certain processes are modeled should be available 
in order to maximize the effectiveness of the simulation. 
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For example, in Janus air defense detection is modeled as a cylinder with unlimited 
altitude capabilities. A simulation which models air defense as a hemisphere ",,'ill have 
different implications in the analysis process. 
Additionally, since simulations are run on computers, a person with system level 
knowledge will prove invaluable. System glitches may wmecessarily prevent use of the 
simulation when someone with system knowledge may be able to easily remedy the 
situation. 
2. Database 
The simulation database must be as complete as possible and include system, sensor 
and weapon characteristics for all relevant friendly and enemy forces. While it is possible 
to enter new infonnation during the planning process, time constraints may preclude this 
option. Furthennore, the accuracy of the infonnation in the database must be a consideration 
during analysis of simulation results. 
3. Terrain Files 
The DMA digitized terrain files which Janus uscs arc the same as those for other 
SOCOM considered models, including JIS and JCM. Assuming time may be a critical 
factor, thl;.': correct terrain file for the AO must be available and, preferably, already loaded 
into the system. The analysis potential using 'similar terrain' rather than the actual terrain 
still exists but greatly diminishes the analysis results. 
4. lntelligence 
The more infommtion that is available on the enemy forces and equipment that may 
be present in the AO, the more valuable a simulation v.'i!! be. There is little need for using 
a simulation to plan routes when enemy detection probabilities are not a oonsidemtion, other 
than to evaluate the effects of route timing on synchronization 
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5. Mission Type 
Of the primary SEAL mission areas lister.! in the N\VP 15 series, simulation applies 
mostly to Direct Action, Special Rccommissance and Counter Terrorism. Although the 
problem of modeling the impact of Foreign Internal Development missions on an overall 
campaign is being considered, the solution is not yet at hand 
C. DELIBERATE PLAl"'NING 
Deliberate planning offers the luxury of time generally not found in military 
planning. For this reason there an:: unique opportunities for the application of simulation. 
Once an operational commander receives objectives and guidance, the deliberate planning 
process begins. Guidance may be very broad in scope, but wi!! identify an AOR. Stated 
objectives ""ill be used cxten.sively for target selection and subsr;:qucnt planning. Simulation 
offers a powerful tool during this process. 
As deliberate planning relies on assumptions regarding the political and military 
situation that will t'xist when the plan is implemented, simulation ean be used to create 
enemy tactical scenarios to include best case, worst case, and most likely case. Once the 
targeting proct'ss is complete, a plan is developed against the prospective target which can 
be run on the simulation. A post-run analysis of detections, engagements, timing, losst's to 
both sides, etc. may indicate critical aspects of the plan where rdinement should be 
considered. Countless iterations of this process are possible. 
Once a plan is developed that appears satisfactorily suceessful from an operational 
standpoint as well as from an analysis of simulation results, that plan can be tested against 
a different potential ent'my situation. The result of continuing in this manner is the 
development ofa plan which is most suitable to a wide range of tactical possibilities. If a 
single plan such as this is not acceptable, a detailed plan for each potential situation can bl: 
developed. 
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Additionally. the luxury of time during deliberate mission planning offers the 
opportunity of conducting any number of sensitivity analyses of a particular plan ( 'what ifs') 
Noting the effect of changing thc number of personnel conducting the mis~ion, the weapon~ 
they carry, the absence/presence of snpporting assets, the positiorJstrength of enemy forces, 
and so forth may identify go/no go criteria or critical aspects of a mission where detailed 
contingency planning needs to be done. 
Take, for example, the planning for Sontay. Four hundred yards south of the prison 
camp lay a walled compound similar in size and appearance to the POW camp. U.S. 
analysts concluded that it was a school honse, althongh there was some conjectnre about llIe 
presence of troops. A simulation of the Sontay plan run bollI with and without a reaction 
force located at the "school" may have yielded important information pertinent to the 
execution of the plan. As a sidenote, it is better to be lucky than good (and best to be lucky 
and good), During the execution of the mission, the confusion created. by the fire of the lead 
HH-53s minigun~ and illumination flares dropped by the C-130s caused one element to 
mistakenly land at the "school", which in fact was a barracks full of armed troops. Had this 
group not fortuitously neutralized the enemy force located there, they would have posoo a 
deadly threat as the raiders withdrew from Sontay.~ 
Many of the factors diSClL%ed above can also be analyzed by multiple rdlearsals, but 
one must weigh cost considerations. Running a plan such as Sontay on a simulation may 
result in identifying necessary tnodifications. The need for these modifications may also 
have been realized during rehearsals but at the increased cost oftime, manpower, assets, fuel, 
and ri~k of losing operational security. Thi~ is not to say thai simulation can replace 
rehearsals. Nolhing is farther from the truth. Simulation may, however, enhanee rehearsals 
by preempting some of the initial stages, or by identifying potential contingencies to be 
rehearsed 
, Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. Perilou~ Option:,. Special Opcrations as ap 
Ipstrument oOT S Forcign Policy, Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Press, 1993, pp. 68-70. 
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D. TIME-SENSITIVE l'LAlVNING 
When the luxury of timl;.': is absent, planners rely on traditional prown methods 
resulting from both doctrine and experience. In both arenas, rehearsals are considered one 
oflbe most valuahle tools for mission planning and preparatiun. With as little as 96 hours 
to plan and prepare for a mission, rehearsal time becomes extremely limited. If simulation 
is used during the planning process as an analysis tool, then when it comes to rehearsal time, 
especially if limited, thl;.': simulation can provide visual moving representation of the plan 
being executed. An operational furce can view a simulation run of the plan, which can be 
paused tor discussiun at any particular point. Furthermore, a last minute contingency which 
may be identified during this process, such as the "school" at Sontay, could be entered into 
the simulation and run in a mailer of minutes. \I,.'hile this may not allow for detailed 
plarming to commence aft.en.vard, it does provide awareness, which may make lhe difference. 
E. DYNAMIC PLANNING 
Without a discussion of the reasuns why dynamic planning may be appropriate, it 
falls between deliberate and time-sensitive as far as being constrained by time. The primary 
difference between the three is that in dynamic planning a conflict is already in progress. As 
a result, a tactical picture of the battlefield can Ix; maintained, whereas in both other 
circumstances, the battlefield may not yet have formed. 
With a picture of thl;.': battlefield and an understanding of the commander's intent for 
the AO, sinlUlation can be used for targeting a~ well as mission planning. If, for example, 10 
MTCONs were developed from the target analysis process, each could be run on a simulation 
in order to determine their impact on subsequent missions, a region, or on a campaign as a 
whole. lbis may give some insight as to a priority ofl\1]CONs for more extensive planning. 
Once a WeON is approved, thc planning process becoml;.':s time-sensitive, and the 
role of simulation changes 
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F. COA PLANNING 
Tn this section of the thesis, the role of simulation in eOAplanning will ~ discussed 
with reference to a notional scenario created specifically for this purposc. Appendix A 
includes a brief description of the situation and mission tasking and Appendices Band e 
depict friendly and enemy order of battle, respectively. This scenario was developed for 
illustrative purposes with precise tactical realism a secondary concern. Thus, some defensive 
positions or choiCt~s for offensive tactics may be flawed . The scenario does, however, 
provide an understandable simulated environment for demonstrating and evaluating the value 
of simulation. Visual representation of cxamples will be used whenevcr possible. 
1. Development 
TIle NSW Mission Planning Guide states that as a rule of thumb, three viable options 
for each of the five phases ofa mission (insertion through extraction) should be developed. 
These options are then consolidated into three complete eOAs. The options for each phase 
arc based primarily on available assets, including both equipment and personnel, terrain in 
the AO, mission requirements, level oftTainlng, and pa~t personal experiences. 
The role of simulation in the initial devclopment of eOA options is limited as the 
brainstonning process precedes analysis. Sinmlations do not monitor asset, equipment, or 
personnel availability, nor do they take into consideration the stated or implied tasks present 
fo r a specific mission or the past experiences of those planning the mission. At th is early 
stage of the p lanning process, intuition, experience, and institutional knowledge reign. Yet 
simulation can be used to assist even the best planner in developing eOAs 
Once order ofbattIe (OB) infonnation is developed into a simulation scenario, the 
situation map that results is a valuable tool in the brainstorming process for eOA options. 
A detailed map study of the AO and the specific target area is made possible by the digitized 
terrain. Guesswork on line of sight capabilities is largely eliminated. The terrain between 
contour intervals does not have to be estimated based on the overall tcrrain, rather it can be 
determined precisely by the lim:: of sight (LOS) nmction. 
Additionally, usmg the LOS function, the range of cm:my sensors and weapons can 
be visually depicted for initial platform selection and route planning. For example, in the 
presented scenario, a visual display of the LOS capabilities of the target 5A-4, shown in 
Appendix D, made air insertion within that arc unrealistic except at extremely low altitude. 
The lack of a strong coa'>la! radar, however, indicated insertion by a maritime asset as more 
feasible 
The simulation database can also be used to verify syskm characteristics for both 
friendly and enemy equipment. eOA options that are dependant on the range ofan enemy 
weapon system or the fuel capacity of a particular platfonn can be quickly checked before 
they are further developed 
In the eOA development process, experience and external faetors such as asset and 
equipment availability are detenninant. The strength of simulation lies primarily in its use 
as a situation map and a database. When time constraints enter into the planning process, 
these uses may he of great value to a planner. 
2. Analysis 
Once three viable eOAs are developed, planners must analyze them in order to 
detennine strengths and weaknesses and ultimately make a reC(lmmendation to the 
commander. While this gem::rally may not include detailed planning of routes and actions 
at the objective area, use ofa simulation makes this not only possible but beneficial to the 
planning process as a whole. Planning routcs at this stage can be done v.;th a relatively small 
time expenditure, depending on the detail ofthe route, but \\-ill serve to provide a commander 
with both more infonnation ahout the COAs and more confidence in the recommendation 
of the planncrs when the time eomcs for a d.ecision. 
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For the purposes of illustration, three eOAs were developed for our notional 
scenario. All three COAs involved insertion by two Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRCs) 
and infiltration by foot to the objective area. COA I involved moving two four man 
elements into the target area for a standard direct action assault using a base element and a 
maneuver elemcnt and dcmolition for the target. COA 2 consisted of moving to within 
standoff weapons range for an AT-4 and a TOWn. eOA 3 used an 60mm mortar from 1000 
meters. 
a. Routes 
Once these COAs were developed, the appropriate NSW forces, weapons, and 
sensors were selected from the data base and deployed in the scenario. Follo",,'ing a geneml 
map study, the LOS function was applied to the pointJpatrolleader (l'TIPL) member of the 
patrol and used to detennine routes into the target area which would provide both efficiency 
of effort and protection from detection.9 The routes were timed in order to coordinate arrival 
at the fmal assault positions in COA I, and in all cases timed to ensure mission completion 
prior to the launching of the fast movers in the invasion force. 
Appendix E shows an example of a route for COA 1. Timing is accomplished 
by using stop nodes or timed stop nodes in the route .. Since Janus is interactive there is the 
opportunity to have a halted unit continue progress or halt a progressing unit during a 
scenario run. 
While Janus does not assign a quantitative estimate of the probability of 
detection over the route as a whole, a graphic verification of the scenario ",,'ill indicate 
9 Once the LOS function is selected, a system must be chosen to apply the 
function. The LOS capabilities of this system at its present location will be displayed. 
From this point, howevcr, thc LOS capabilitics of the same system ean be displayed at 
any given pGlnt ",,'ithin the terrain file merely by placing the cursor at that point and 
clicking the mouse button. 1bis allows proper tactical deployment of systems as well as 
detailed route planning. 
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parameters for appropriate combinations of friendly and enemy forces . For example, there 
is a selection matrix for graphical verificatlon of the scenario developed as eOA 1. 
Sdecting the sensor characteristics of the automatic weaponsman (A W) versus the 
opposition rifleman on the target site produces the infannation sho,~n in Appendix F. This 
perfonnance curve can be used 10 detennine at what r.mgt: detection is both possible and 
probable. "Ihey can be generated for wl;.':apons capabilities, engagement pardIIlcters, and 
PHfPK infonnation as well, all ""ith a single dick of a mouse hutton. 
Aftef route selection, successive scenario runs will provide information about 
the validity of the route. During a scenario run, enemy sensor detection capability shows up 
on the screen as indicated in Appendix G, as well as being recorded in the post run data file. 
h is important to realize that thcse detections indicate only that thai particular point on the 
routc fell within thc detcction capabilities of the enemy unit. This information must then he 
pUl into context ofthe mission by thc planncrs. Ambient lighting conditions, camouflage, 
concealment which may not have bcen prescnt on the terram. file, surprise, and so forth may 
all impede that dcte<:\ion and make the route more valid. Janus has alternate databases for 
day and night conditions, and JTS also modds different physical positions, such as 
crouching, hut it is imperative that these facts are knov.n during eOA analysis. 
Changes in enemy positions can be made in minutes. Stationary forces such 
as those in the target area on eOA 1 can be given patrol routes. TIte impa<:\ of these 
possibilities on dctc<:tion probahilitics and on timing considerations can then be evaluated 
'with additional scenario runs. 
h. Actions at the Objective Area 
Actions at the objectivc area are the primary focus of mission planning. As 
statcd earlier, special operations can rarely be repeated, and mission success can not be 
achieved \\>ithout successful actions at the objective area. Determining the type of action (in 
our scenario DA or standoff weapon assault), thc correct force structure, weapon types. and 
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so fonh are critical decisions. Simulation can aid in these decisions both hemistiely and 
analylically. 
Using simulation may assist in determining both weapon selection and most 
effective position for thc fInal assault. In the notional scenario, three COAs were developed 
for actions at the objective area. For illustration purposes, five runs were conducted for each 
COA scenario. A look at the five post-run data files for each COA showed that the TOW 
IT at 500 meters consistently scored a lethal hit in less shots than did the AT -4 at 100 meters. 
While this may not be surprising, there is now data to verify the fact. This information may 
impact on both the number of weapons necessary for the assault force as well as force size 
considerations. 
A look at the database values could also have provided the infonnation about 
the TOW II versus the AT -4. What simulation offers, however, is the ability to note the 
effect that varying the wt"apon selected and the fIring range has in regard to detection 
probability, attrition rates, and kill rates for the target. 
Simulation can also assist in determining the best range at which to fire the 
weapons. Beginning at the weapons maximum effective range, the firing range can be 
decreased by appropriate increment~ and the respective effect on the probability of kill 
recorded. This infonnation can then be compared to both enemy detection and enemy 
PHlPK infonnation, the goal being to locate a point of compromise where weapons accuracy 
is satisfactory while dctection and engagement by the enemy are not a foregone conclusion. 
This can also be translated inlo the best position for observation ofan airfield or a harbor 
where view is maximized while ddection minimized. 
Once again, a simulation only considers details whieh it has been programmed 
to oonsider. Vegetation which does not appear in the terrain file or a recently eret1ed 
building may render a firing or observation position useless once the operational element 
arrives on the target. When this is not the case, however, simulation may save hours of 
reconnaissance time by assisting in the location of a position before deployment. 
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The use of simulation during the mission planning process win also add 
factual analysis for responses to questions often asked by commanders during the course of 
a briefing. For example, "How would you rate the chances for success on this mission?" 
Again, Janus or J f S ""ill not provide a nwnerical estimate fer the overall chances of success 
of a panicular scenario. Multiple scenario nms, however, will provide the infonnation 
necessary to help make this type of assessment. A route which is masked on 49 out of 50 
nms, or actions at the objective which result in success with no friendly casualties on 90 out 
of 1 00 mns provide a quantitative measure of lhe probability of success. More important 
than the actual number is the fact that the analytic power of simulation has validated rather 
than refuted the plan, which should increase the confidence of the operators as well as the 
commander making the final employment decisions. 
The reasons for GolNo Go criteria arc often requested by commanders during 
briefings as well. lbere are tactical reasons for a criteria such as having 6 SEALs available 
for the final assault which require no computer analysis. For example, command and control 
considerations, security at the objective area, search teams, etc. These considerations may 
not, however, justify a No Go criteria of 10 SEALs. If 100 simulation runs ofa particular 
scenario show attrition increasing and overall mission succcss dcclining with an assault force 
of less than 10, and this nwnber is desired by the officer in chargc (Ole), then the criteria 
gains a certain level of justification. Furthermore, 100 runs of the mission will give a 
perccntage of how often 6 or 10 SEALs actually were available at the target area for the final 
assault 
c. MUltiple Runs 
A single scenario run can provide certain insights, but meaningful analysis 
requires multiple runs. TIle probabilistic nature of a simulation necessitales multiple runs 
in order to detcrmine recurring trends or events which are anomolies. The idea that battle 
is probabilistic and an event will nevcr repeat itself exactly indicate the nced for repeated 
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testing of a plan. In training and preparing for a mission, multiple rehearsals are conducted 
both to familiarize the operators .... 1th the plan as well as to identity and remedy problem 
areas. A single rehearsal will not identify every problem. What goes right the first time may 
not go right for the next ten rehearsals. The same is true of a probabilistic simulation, thus 
the necd for multiple runs. 
3, Selection 
Many factors wi\] oontribute to the decision of which eOA to recommend as the 
primary choice, such as asset availability, training, and im1incts. These factors havc been 
and should continue to be the primary source of selection criteria. Furthermore, a well 
planned mission will likely result in success when run on a simulation. Selecting a eOA 
which has consistently resulted in detection, personnel losses, or mission failure when run 
on a simulation, however, may not be the right choice. Locating the points at which 
detection occurred or where engagements resulted in losses will allow planners to evaluate 
whether or not they believe these are risks to the mission and whether or not they are 
acceptable. At a minimwn, problems which are identified hy a simulation encourage another 
look, forcing planners to be honest about the eOA chosen and countetweighling the common 
tendency to select the desired option in the face of indications to the contrary. The end result 
should be an improved plan. 
In today's world where there is a very small margin for error, additional reassurance 
to a commander may make the difference between deploying to the target area or back to the 
team area. Since simulation can benefit operators and planner:; during the mission planning 
process, it \',111 require little additional time to conduct a statistical analysis of a particular 
mission. Multiple runs and the statistical analysis which follow can bc achieved by an 
analyst who is not directly involved with mission planning and preparation. In the end, 
providing the tactical com;iderations used to determine the primary eOA option and backing 
that information up with statistical analysis from a simulation should increase the oonfidence 
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of both operators and the commanders who will make employment decisions, resulting in 
incrca~ed opportunities and success 
G. TIME CONSIDERATIONS 
The previous discussions have ccntert:d around being abk to make multiple scenario 
It is important to understand that sCl;.':nario dcvdopmcnt and scenario runs both t.'lke 
time. Assuming that the intelligence was available on both friendly and enemy OB, scenario 
development for something of the scope presented in the notional scenario could be 
accomplished within approximately 4-6 hours. This would include loading the correct 
terrain file, extracting the appropriate systems from the database, and using the LOS and 
VIEW functions to tactically deploy systerru; in sound positions in the vicinity ofintdligence 
reported locations. At this point, existing offensive plans (such as those of the invasion 
force) are built within the scenario. 
Creating a route for a given sy!>'tcm, such as an aircraft, can be accomplished in less 
than a minute if precise turning points arc not necessary. In the case of thc routes for the 
SEAL elements, where a more precise tcrrain study is necessary in order to maximize 
efficiency and limit detection probability, 10 to 15 minutes may be rcquired. Planning 
indirect fire missions, such as artillery bombardments, can also be achieved in a matter of 
minutes, assuming targets and timing are known. 
Scenario runs can be conducted in real time if desired, but morc commonly at a rate 
of up to 20 timcs nonnal speed on Janus and ITS, making mUltiple runs a \iab1c option. 
Increasing nm time does not limit the detail or accuracy of the scenario, rather it is a function 
of CPU capabili ties and workload. 
Thc time required for post-run data analysis will depend on the detail of analysis 
dcsired. Post-run data files contain a great deal of infounation, and it is necessary to focus 
the analysis if time is constraincd. 
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As is the case ... :ith all oomputer software, there are intricacies within simulations 
which, once mastered, significantly reduce the time required to develop and run a scenario. 
Route copying functions and graphical scenario verification are examples. Repeated use 
will undoubtedly result in the most efficient and effective use of a simulation such as Janus 
orJTS. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
SOP operators are renowned for their attention to detail during thc planning process 
and their ability to adapt and overcome when obstacles hinder a mission. Preplanning for 
such obstacles can only benefit those conducting the mission. Whether it is used for 
locating potential detection threats, determining force size or weapon selection, or merely 
as a rehearsal tool, simulation can improve on an already fined tuned planning process. 
There are many more potential uses for simulation than those which have been 
described. Some of these will be discussed in the following chapter, but repeated exposure 
and use by the operators themselves will undoubtedly result in many unique applications for 
the NSW community. TIlls chapter has demonstrated the potential use of simulation during 
tactical mission planning. The ideas and processes described can be extrapolated as 
appropriate as additional uses for simulation are undertaken. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RF:COMMEN"DATlONS 
In a time of doing more with kss, it is important to wld~rstaJ\d that there are more 
potential uses for simulation than assisting with route development and weapon selection. 
Having demonstrated its rolt: during the mission planning cycle, the following is a cursory 
discussion of additional roles for simulation in the NSW community as \vell a~ a description 
of models other than Janus that SOCOM is currently evaluating and developing. 
A. ADDITIONAL ROLES FOR SIMULATION IN NSW 
1. Situation J\lap 
One of the first octions to take place when mission planning commences is the 
creation ofa tactical situation map. This "sitmap" normally includes the disposition of all 
known friendly and enemy forces in the AO as well as the detection capabilities of radars 
located both on land and on naval vessels. Throughout the planning process it will be 
referred to for COA development. route plaIming, and so forth_ Maintaining the sitmap in 
all accurate, readable, and usable state is generally the job of the intelligence directorate (N2) 
and requires a great deal of time 
A high resolution simulation such as Janus can be used in place of the conventional 
situation map. Once the terrain file is loaded, all available information on friendly and 
enemy forces can be pulled from the database and placed into a scenario file . Forces and 
equipment will be identifIed by appropriate icons which can be changed to suit the user as 
desired. Using a simulation for this purpose is simple and the advantages are substantial. 
First, the simulation terrain graphics provide an accurate and easily updatable 
pictorial depiction of the battlefield. Second, it interacts with the database to provide, on 
request, visual representation of sensor and weapon capahilities to include minimum and 
maximum ranges aIld the orientation ofplatfOln1s such as anti-aircraft arti!lary (AAA) (if 
they are known). Third, aIly number of overlays can be created to show routes of reaction 
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forces, CAS flight<; and so on. Finally, crcating thc sinnap on a simulation amOlUlts to thc 
initial development of the scenario which wil l evenrually be used for COA analysis and 
detaikd mission planning. 
2. Database 
The databasc on a high resolution simulation such as Janus contains dozens of data 
entries for every piecc of equipment. Rather than referring to manuals on enemy eqllipment 
to tind characteristics relevant to mission planning, a simulation database can be used to 
store the infonnation in a categorizt:d easily accessible manner. Furthennore, weapon and 
sensor range capabilities can be visually depicted with the click of a mouse hutton rather than 
swinging arcs on a topographical map. The impact of terrain features is precisely calculated 
not guessed. The process of developing such a database may be time conswning, but the 
result would be a valuable mission planning tool. 
3. BriermgfDebricfing Tool 
Utilizing simulation during the planning process w1ll also provide a tool for briefing 
purposcs. A commander receiving a COA, CONOPS, or other related briefing will see not 
only a professional interactive presentation, using command and control (CAC) overlays for 
relevant a<;pects of a mission, but will also be privy to analysis capabilities during thc brief. 
Following mission execution, a simulation can be used to compare actions during the 
mission to those preplanned. Changes to the original plan which occum.-d during the mission 
can be entered into the simulation and their impact assessed. This serves not only as a 
potential source of lessons learned, but also as a way to verify the accuracy of the model. 
comparing actual mission results to those predicted by the simulation. Additional COAs 
which may rcsult from a post-mission analysis can be run and their effectiveness assessed. 
Using open source infonnation, USSOCOM J-SC developed scenarios of the Task 
Force Ranger mission in Mogadishu and the SEAL mission at Patilla. Certain paramt:ters 
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\vithin the model were adjusted in order 10 create historically correct scenarios. Such a 
scenario allows commanders to visually replay events, any nwnber of times, and conduct 
analysis as desired, offering a tremendous potential for lessons learned. 
4. Training Scenarios 
Developing a scenario for a training mission that is both realistic and provides an 
environment conducive to achieving the training objective is a difficult task. Just as in the 
case ofa situation map, a simulation can be used to develop a training scenario. Opposing 
forces and equipment can be situated based on historical scenarios, OPLAl~/CONPLAN 
scenarios, or merely in such a manner as to be tactically sound. 
Simulation will provide thl;.': intelligence and operations directorates (N2 and N3) with 
the capability to develop scenarios which focus on a certain aspect of training, such as the 
use of standoff weapons. By creating diITl:rent "threat packages" and altering locations and 
strengths of enl:my forces , a scenario can be developed and tested to make a direct assault 
on a target less than desirdble. 
5. Gaming 
Utilizing simulation for training purpose:; offers a Lmique opportunity for 
development of tactical prowess in the tactical leaders of operational forces. Besides 
offering an analysis tool for mission planning, a multi-sided simulation provides an effective 
arena for gaming missions v.ith opposition forces without the time and cost of actual forcc 
on force training. In "Winning the Ne;,.1 War: hmovation and the :\.1odern Military" Stephen 
Peter Rosen discusses the role of simulation and gaming in detennining nl:w military 
doctrine in the case of naval carrier aviation 
The potential of navaJ aviatioo was clearly demonstrated in WWI. The question 
which becamc painfully apparent WdS whether aircraft caniers were to fl:maln the eyes of the 
battleships or constitute an independent strike force that would replace the battleship as the 
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dominant naval weapon. There were no realistic fleet exercis~s that could be used to test the 
validity of the proposed new role for aircraft carriers. One attempt in 1923 used baUleships 
as nominal aircraft carriers and single aircraft had to represent squadrons, because real 
carriers and airplanes were not available. The value of the resulting information was limited. 
Simulations of naval warfare, however, could be used to extrapolate technological 
trends in the strategic environment. No navy in the world could put t\vo hundred aircraft out 
to sea on aircraft carriers in the 1920's. But what if they could? This sort of what if can be, 
and in fact was analyzed v.ith simulation and gaming. The doctrinal changes involving 
carrier aviation are apparent in today's navy and the evidence points to simulated 
engagements performed in war games as the reason.IO 
The process that Rosen discusses can be extrapolated to SOF fairly easily. There are 
often an over abundance of constraints placed on an opposition force during a training 
mission, both for safety reasons and to ensure the opposed unit achieves their training 
objective. After all, time and resources are limited. 
Simulation can help remove these constraints. Facing an experienced operator in an 
opposition role without safety considerations offers a safe environment to develop and test 
innovative ideas. A junior officcr or non-commissioned officer who is challenged by a 
commander v.ith a "Kobi Oshi Morn"" must demonstrate their knowledge of tactics, 
capabilities of men and equipment, and their personal ability to perform under pressure. All 
of this can be evaluated by a commander without deploying. Again, simulation should never 
be considered as a substitute for actual training, rather it is an effective supplement 
jQ Paraphrased from Rosen, Stephen P. Winning the Next War innovation and 
the Modern Mjljtap' Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991 , pp. 68-71. 
II Kobi Oshi Morn is the name given to the unv.inable scenario that Cadets faced 
before graduation from Star Fleet Academy on the original Star Trek. Interestingly, this 
simulated scenario forced Captain James T. Kirk to innovate in order to survive, and thus 
become the only cadet to ever succeed in a Kobi Oshi Mom. 
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B. EMPLOYMENT CONSU>ERA TIONS 
The follo\Ving subjects arc addressed anJy hriefly with the inknt of providing the 
NSW community a clear concept of what may be involved \,ith acquiring and implementing 
a combat simulation model. 
1. Hardware/Software 
Janus is currently run on an UNIX based HP workstation. ITS and JCM will soon 
be UNIX hased a~ well. It is inevitabk that technological advancements will aHow 
simulations such as Janus, JTS, or JCM to be run on a desktop or laptop PC, but that is 
currently not the case. Inc software for any of the aforementioned simulations is already 
owned hy the military and can be acquired free of charge. 
2. Database 
a. Creation 
The initial creation of an accurate database is a major task. 111ere arc already 
databases maintained hy commands such a" the Army's Training and Doctrine Command 
Analysis Command (TRAC) that may be acquired which contain a great deal of the data on 
both friendly and "enemy" (mostly former Soviet) equipment. Furthennore, Jim Cook, a 
civilian contractor in NG at the Naval Special Warfare Command, has been involved in a 
project to create a database of detection characteristics for all NSW equipment. Whatever 
the source of the infonnation, acquiring consolidating, verif}'ing, and entering it into a 
database \.\111 he a time consuming task. It is a task, however, which must be accomplished 
before a simulation can provide any "real world" value. 
b. Management 
As indicated throughout this thesis, manipulation of database entries is a 
major source of infonnation during mission planning and one of the main strengths of 
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simulation. It is not difficult to imagine, however, that a database could become a j umbled 
mess of notional values rather than an accurate depiction of current intelligence. For this 
reason, database management is crucial. 
While it will be up to the individual command to determine the best method 
of maintaining their database, one suggestion follows. Assuming that simulation is being 
used at the SEAL Tearn level for training purposes, and deployed for use by an MPA as 
required, a ma~ter database could be developed and maintained by the N2 at the appropriate 
Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG). Copies of this database could be downloaded to 
individual warns, where a master copy would again be maintained. For each planning 
iteration, an additional copy of the database could be dO\Vllloaded for use and manipulation 
as desired without damage to the original. It is important to remember, however, that the 
value ofan analysis of a miss ion is minimal if those reviewing it, such as the NSWG, are not 
privy to the database values used dwing the analysis. 
3. Terrain Files 
OPLAN/CONPLA.N requirements, combined with an intelligence assessment of 
likely employment possibilities and the commanders vision for the unit will provide the basis 
for initial tcrrain file nceds. Additional files can be ~equested through DMA as necessary, 
but take time to acquire. Advancements in data storage capabilities \"ill undoubtedly allow 
a command to maintain a library of all desired terrain files. 
4. Users 
While user requirements at any particular command will be dictated by the 
commander, the following can be used as a guideline for training time. These estimates are 
based on my experience during the writing of this thesis but are generally agreed with by 
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experts in the tield. 12 I3asic proficiency in the operation of a simulation such as Janus can 
be obtained through an 8 hour course. After this instruction, planners would be able to use 
the menus present during scenario development anr.! execution, or in short, cn:atc and run 
scenarios. This includes dctennining the correct ((main, force definition, route planning, 
indirect fire planning, and so fonh. With 40 hours of instruction, a user can become a skilled 
analyst able to work with post run-data, command and control (CAC) overlays, and most 
importantly, have a fairly clear understanding of the processes and algorithms present in the 
simulation. 
It may bl;.': possible to work v.ith the Naval Postgraduate School in developing such 
courses of irutruction. Whatever the source, the "train the trainer" concept should aUaw the 
NSW community to become self supporting in its use of simulation with re latively small 
lime and monetary expenditures. 
C. SOCOM MODELS 
C=ntly, USSOCOI .... t 1-5C is developing the Joint Tactical Simulation (lTS) . JTS 
takes the best aspects of several other simulations, the cornerstone bcing the Joint Conflict 
Model (lCM), and combines them in a single high resolution simulation. In the development 
and evaluation of lTS, SOCOM concentrated on four primary areas: Responsiveness; 
Portability; Flexibility; Usability 
Current scenario development time is too long for SOF purposes. Therefore. 
SOCOM is looking at a simulation which increases responsiveness. The portability issue 
willlargcly be solved with time, as advancements in computer tedmology allow a simulation 
such as lIS to be run on a notebook size computer. Flexibility is a primary concern, 
especially for NSW. In the joint arena of special operations, if a simulation is to prove 
valuable, it must meet the requirements of each component. Janus, for cxample, docs not 
12 From a discussion with Bard Mansagcr, a mathematics professor at NPS and 
the resident cxpert in CSM. 
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model the maritime environment with any detail JTS, on the other hand, includes water 
depth, currents, and sea states; aspects which are cmcial in most NSW missions. Finally, 
current simulations are very user friendly. Whether using Janus or ITS, basic operation of 
the simulation can be achieved in a single day of training 
ITS contains most of the aspects ofa SOF simulation which have been identified as 
important. It is not a two sided simulation, such as Janus, rather it can model up to ten sides. 
With this capability, all the different factions involved in a conflict such as Somalia can be 
modeled separately, as well as the civilian popUlation. 
Route development capabilities are greatly enhanced. In Janus, terrain does affect 
the speed of an operator during a patrol. Opt:rators, however, are supermen of sorts, as 
nothing else affects their speed. ITS uses a fatigue factor to accoWlt for this. While it is true 
that no two operators will fatigue at the same rate, general trends can be determined and 
modeled and these trends taken into consideration in the analysis of a mission. 
Furthermore, lTS models various physical positions and speeds for operators. Whlle 
all patrols are standing and at the predetennined database speed in Janus, JTS allows 
crawling, walking, and running, as well as positions including standing, crouching, and 
prone. This adds a great deal of realism and accuracy to the model and increases the value 
of the mission analysis it produces. 
Routes in ITS will also be more interactive. Whlle a mission is being run in an urban 
environment, an operator canjump into a building for reconnaissance pwposes or cover and 
concealment. Rules of engagement (ROE) are also being included in JTS . The impact of 
ROE on a particular mission may be more fully appreciated when a simulation run identifies 
engagements which resulted in friendly losses due to ROE restrictions. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of computer simulation for mission planning is bound to have both 
proponents and adversaries. In a community such as special operations, adversaries are 
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most likely as technology is not viewed by them in the best light. The most common attack 
received during the writing of this thesis was that the way Janus portrayed a particular part 
of an operation wa:; unrealistic. For example, the PH and PK values for certain engagement 
possibilities may follow given values, but in reality they are much different. "nlC response 
has been to "change them." Simulations arc not some magic tool. They consider only the 
processes and parameters that they are told to consider. If any of these processes or 
parameters are inherently flawed, they can be changed. That is the power of the system. 
The attack that inevitably fo llows is what about the one exceptional mission where 
Murphy's Laws are in full effect and fratricide occurs? Simulations arc not designed to 
predict when that will happen. They are based on mathematical models and the laws of 
probability and predict what could happen given the same circwnstances as programmed in 
the simulation. Since the mission plaTm..ing process centers around detelTllining these 
circumstances, simulation should prove valuable. Furthermore, Janus and JTS model 
fratricide and it would not be difficult to include its occurrence on one percent of all direct 
action missions, for example, and nole thc surprising and undesirable affecls of its 
A combat simulation model such as JTS is only valuable ifuscd correctly and ",ill 
never replace standard mission planning pl""dctices or common sense and ell:pcrienee. But the 
technology exists and is already in use by many operational forces. It may be only a matter 
of time before the choice \0 utilize simulation is no longer a choice, but rather a directive. 
With an understanding of the process and a minimal expcnditnrc of resources, thc NSW 
community can be on the leading edge of the simulation revolution 
E. RECOM"ME!'iDATIONS 
If sjmulation is to gain acceptance in the NSW community at thc operator level, 
implementation will have to be horizontal rather than venical. Systems placed at the Team 
level which can bc used in any or all of the respects described above will give operators a 
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chance to learn, evaluate, and i1U1ovate uses for simulation themselves. Testing at the staff 
level has already been conducted by U$$OCOM and would prove more effective for NSW 
if oonduetcd in conjunction "'ith the Teams rather than prior to their introduction to 
simulation 
There is great potential for the usc of simulation in aspects ofNSW which have not 
been addressed, such as riverine operations. Evaluation of tactics, potential locations of 
detection threats, as well as mission planrring, are possible uses for commands such as SBU-
26 in Panama. The role of simulation is limited only by the imagination and as special 
operators are known for their ingenuity, there may be no more appropriate place to employ 
simulation than in their nUlks. 
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APPENDIX A. NOTIONAL SCENARIO SlTUATION AND TASKING 
SitJ!.a.ti.!m: Country Blue has planned an amphibious assault against the beligerent 
country Red. The assault force is to conunence landing operations at 0400. Country Red's 
Ordcr o f Banie is depicted in Appendix C. "lhe fast-movers launching from the camer battle 
group (CVSG) located at grid 350 950 are threatened by the SA-4 site located at 444 993 
(See Appendix D for capabilities ofSA-4). 
lM..kin.g: One SEAL Platoon is to launch from the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 
located at grid 350 860 and render the SA-4 located at 444 993 inoperable for a minimum 
of 12 hours beginning no earlier than 0330 and no laler than 0400. 
Note: 
Positions ofCVBG, ARG, etc. were intentionally chosen at unrealistic ranges so as 
to appear on one Janus screen. Just as is true with a topographical map, the larger the size 
of the area depicted on the screen the less detail shown. 
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APPENDIX D. NOTIONAL SCENARIO FRJENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE 
Locations of the major elements of the blue assault force are depicted. Reference 
Appendix C for grid, Carrier lalmching fastmovcrs - 350 950. ARG launching SEALs - 350 
860 , CRRCs in transi t - 440 930. Destroyers for NGFS - 420880 and 520 760. LCACs and 
AAA V 5 - 510 800. Helicopter assault force· 410 730 
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APPENDIX C. NOTIONAL SCENARIO ENEMY ORDER OF BATI'LE 
Major red elements are depicted. The concentration of forces inclwJing troops, 
AM, APCs etc. are locmed within area bounded by 550 850, 550950,700950,700 8S0 
The targel SI\-4 with supporting securilY element is locmed at 444 993 . 
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APPENIlIX D. DETECnON CAPABILITIES OF SCENARIO SA-4 
The detection and range capahilities of the target SA-4 arc depicted including the 
effects of intcrvt:ning vegc\<ltion 
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APPENDIX E. EXA MP LE COA I ROUTE 
The SEAL clement from eOA 1 is shown disrnolmtcd from the CRRCs. The white 
line indicates their preplanncd route to the targe!. Triangles indicate a '"00 Node", inverted 
trinagles indicate a " Stop Node", and ill) inverted triangle with a number underneath would 
indicate a "Timed Stop Nolie" . 
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APPENDIX F. GRAPHIC VER(FICA TlON 
This graph depicts the probability of the blue A \V acquiring the red rifleman as a 
function af range . Sensor I is eyeballs, sensor 2 is binoculars. Graphic vierification can be 
produced for any combination of systems and show sensor or weapon capabilities 
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APPENDIX G. DETECTION 
Two four man assault clements arc depicted patrolling on pr~plal1l1~d routes. The 
red bar i.ndieates the locaLion of a red system which :1as the capability of detecting the blue 
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